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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
incurred damages, i.e., the judgment increases his debts, it impairs
his credit and subjects his property to a judgment-lien. Further-
more, a requirement of payment would permit the insurance com-
pany to take unfair advantage of the financial status of its insured.
ARTIcLE 32- AcCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3213: Procedure held available in suit on separation
agreement.
The procedure for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint
is available, pursuant to CPLR 3213, in those actions "based upon
a judgment or instrument for the payment of money only." A
speedy and effective means of securing a judgment, on claims hav-
ing a strong presumptive merit in instances wherein a formal com-
plaint would be superfluous,24 is thus provided. Motivated by the
rules of construction applicable to the CPLR, 5 New York courts
have generally taken an expansive view of this accelerated pro-
cedure.
Lacking specific indication of legislative intent, courts have
adopted a practical approach in construing the statute. Although
of recent vintage, a continuum of cases under the statute has pro-
vided clearly discernible lines of development.2 6  Invocation of the
procedure has been limited to those cases in which the obligation
created is not only certain but simple and absolute, i.e., free from
any condition or contingency.27  The procedure is thus applicable
to those situations in which the instrument is, upon its face, evi-
dence of a debt; evidence, not merely of the right of the litigant to
recover but of the liability of the defendant to pay. Thus, where
proof of extrinsic facts is necessary, such facts must be averred in
an accompanying complaint.
2, FIRST REP. 91; 4 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRAcricE 3213.01 (1968).
22 Construction: "The civil practice law and rules shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
civil judicial proceeding." CPLR 104.
2G The cases have been singularly consistent in their construction of the
words "instrument for the payment of money only." See, e.g., Signal Plan,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 App. Div. 2d 636, 256 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st
Dep't 1965); Burnell v. Peoples Say. Bank of Yonkers, 54 Misc. 2d 140,
281 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967); Vanni v. Long Island City
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 453, 278 N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. T. 2d
Dep't 1965); Embassy Indus., Inc. v. SML Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 91, 256
N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1964); Lopez v. Perry, 53 Misc. 2d 445,
278 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).
27The construction of the words "an instrument for the payment of
money only" has historical origins. For an identical construction, see Adler
v, Bloomingdale, 8 N.Y. Super. Ct. (1 Duer) 601 (1852).
1969]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The courts have consistently held that the "instrument" need
not be negotiable .2  Thus, the procedure has been held available to
the holder, of an unconditional guaranty of a note.29 A more recent
and, perhaps, significant extension of the application of section 3213
is to be found in Baker v. Gundermann,30 holding that a letter for-
warded to the plaintiff would qualify as an instrument under the
section. Conversely, the courts have refused invocation of the
accelerated procedure where the determination would depend upon
proof of facts outside' the instrument itself. An early clarification
held that the remedy of summary judgment in lieu of a complaint
did not lie upon an action "to recover security, deposited under
the terms of a lease." "1 So too, under 3213, it has- been held that
in an action to recover monies paid because of alleged ecfiomc
duress, pursuant to a oprepayment clause in a moitgage, plaintift
must serve a formal complaint before -moving for a summary
judgment. 32
A recent case has extended the scope of section 3213 into thie
matrimonial area. In Orenstein v. Orenstein," the Civil Court,
Queens County, was confronted with the substantive issue 0f
whether a separation agreement may serve as a basis for* 3213
relief. The court held a separation' agreement, the'terms- of which
were absolute, specific and unconditional, to be an "inistrxfient for
the payment of money only" within the confines of the statute.
In view of the tenor of prior decisions and the policy 6rientted
approach 11 adopted by the court, such a construction would seem
to be a rational extension of this motion device compatible With
legislative intent.
CPLR 3213: Words "instrument for the paymnent of money oniy'
liberally construed.
The continued expansion of CPLR 3213 35 is evidenced. by the
recent case of Mike Nasti Sand Company v. Almar Landscaping
28 Louis Sherry Ice Cream Co. v. Kroggel, 42 Misc. 2d 21, 245 NY.S.2d
755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963); Channel Excavators, -Inc. v.* Amato
Trucking Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 429, 264 N.Y.S.2d 98"7 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1965).
29 M. Gilston, Inc. v. Ullman, 45 Misc. 2d 6, 255 N.Y.S.2d 747, (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1965).
3052 Misc. 2d 639, 276 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County .1966).
-Embassy Indus., Inc. v. SML Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 91, 256 N.Y.S.2d
495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966)..
32 Burnell v. Peoples Say. Bank of Yonkers, 54 Misc. .2d 140, .281
N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967).
358 Misc. 2d 377, 295 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1968).
34 In view of the liberal policy of extending the benefits of 3213 -it -would
appear to be implicit in the court's emphasis upon public policy that, when
confronted with an ambiguous situation, it would be disposed to allow relief,
"See 7B McKINiEY's CPLR 3213, commentary 817 (1963),.- .
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